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l Polish foreign policy and public opinion attitudes have
become more ‘European’ since the early Bush era, when
Poland supported the invasion of Iraq. Nevertheless, Poland
still differs from its key European partners such as Germany
and France in its views on Russia and expects its viewpoint to
be reflected in the debate on the new EU-US agenda.
l Poland’s priorities for the new transatlantic agenda are
regional rather than global. They focus on the countering
of Russia’s insurgence and anchoring other Eastern
European countries more firmly in the Western orbit. The
implementation of EU Eastern Partnership project as well as
well as keeping NATO expansion on the agenda should be
seen as tools to achieve this objective. Both US and the EU
should become again more committed to assisting democracy 
in Eastern Europe and elsewhere in the world.
l The war in Georgia and the gas crisis in Ukraine have
brought back regional security issues to the top of the
transatlantic agenda. There is an urgent need to re-invent
NATO as a regional security provider as well as to take
practical steps to ensure energy security for both EU and the
countries of the Eastern Europe, which are now largely
dependent on Russia in this respect.
l Poland is willing to contribute to solving global challenges
such as combating terrorism (Afghanistan), climate change
or the Middle East (Iran, Israeli-Palestinian conflict) but
would oppose policies which could harm its vital security
interest as a ‘trade off’ (e.g. measures combating climate
change which would increase energy dependence on Russia
etc).
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1. Polish-American relations during the Bush era
The defining event of the Polish transatlantic relations during the Bush era wasthe war in Iraq, and the unconditional support, both political and military,given to this war by the left-wing government of Leszek Miller. At the time, the 
participation of the Polish troops in the occupation of Iraq had broad political support
from left and right. However, it contradicted the policies of Poland’s European
partners, Germany and France, which were deeply opposed to the war. Their
governments and (even more so) the general public blamed Poland and other new
members of the EU for failing to join the Europe-wide opposition to Bush policy on
Iraq and thus preventing the creation of the common European position on this issue.
The Germans seemed particularly indignant about Polish ‘ungratefulness’ for the
German support (political and financial) of Poland’s EU membership and German
media repeated the slogan of ‘American Trojan horse in Europe’. Poland’s opposition 
to some provisions of the so-called European constitutional treaty (especially double
majority voting) further aggravated Germany’s mistrust of the Polish political class.
On the other hand, many politicians and opinion-makers in Poland were appalled by
a wave of what they perceived as anti-Americanism spilling across Western Europe.
The urgent sense that Europe and America are drifting apart and that Poland (and other
former communist countries) should do whatever was possible to prevent such
a transatlantic drift was a major factor behind the signing of the ‘letter of eight’ in
support of the Bush policy on Iraq. As Ivan Krastev put it, ‘anti anti-Americanism’
became the credo of the political elite in Central Europe. It consisted in the belief that
Poland and other ‘new Europeans’ should see to it that ever more integrated Europe will 
position itself as a US partner rather than a ‘counterbalance’ to US global influence.
Following the results of 2005 elections, the new populist-nationalist government of
Jaroslaw Kaczynski (as well as his brother President Lech Kaczynski) gradually
moved away from this dual commitment to EU integration and transatlanticism by
favouring ties with the United States over its relations with the key European
partners. The Kaczynskis viewed the process of the deepening of European
integration as a tool of German domination in Europe and saw the relations with the
US as a counterbalance for both German and Russian influence. Unfortunately for the 
Kaczynskis, this came at a time when, in the second term of office, the Bush
administration sought to improve the relations with Germany, while Poland’s
continuing presence in Iraq was gradually losing its significance as a tool of
Polish-American ‘strategic partnership’ (indeed, it never had as much significance as
the Polish policy makers hoped it would).
For this reason the Kaczynskis embraced the American proposal to place the elements 
of the so-called anti-missile shield in Poland and in the Czech Republic. It was for
them a chance for an upgrade of Poland’s role as a major US partner in Europe.
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It should be added that this view of the shield was by no means confined to the
Kaczynskis’ supporters and was endorsed by some opposition politicians and
independent foreign policy experts (while others remained critical).
2. The ‘Europeisation’ of Poland’s public opinion
and its implications for the transatlantic relations
The Iraq intervention, and especially the Polish participation in it had been deeplyunpopular with the majority of the public opinion. Such critical attitudes became even stronger as the news of Polish casualties as well as continued mayhem in
Iraq reached Poland. In time, the criticism of the war in Iraq had started to erode the
generally positive views of the US and the US role in the world, which were prevailing
in Poland following the fall of communism. This trend is clearly visible in the GMF
Transatlantic Trends Survey. Thus in 2008 only 34% of the Poles thought it was
desirable for the US to exert strong leadership in world affairs, while 46% were of the
opposite opinion. For comparison, in 2002 (the first TT Survey) 64% of the Poles
supported strong US leadership while only 22% were opposed to it. It should be noticed 
here that the attitudes of the Polish public are fairly close to the average TT results for
11EU members, where 34 percent of the respondents supports US leadership. At the
same time, more than two-thirds of the Poles were supportive of EU leadership in
global affairs (a tall order at the moment), again very much in line with the European
average. The average temperature of Poles’ feelings towards the USA is on TT
‘thermometer’ is 55 (out of 100) as compared to EU11 average of 52. Romania, the
most pro-American EU member, has 66 out of 100.
The 2008 TT Survey demonstrates that on the majority of foreign policy issues Polish
attitudes are closer to the EU average rather than that of the US. In a number of cases
(such as democracy promotion), the Poles were more skeptical than other EU members
and (just like other Central Europeans) less interested and dedicated to tackling global
issues). One issue where Poles and Americans differ most widely is the use of force in
international affairs, which Poles strongly oppose and do not seem to believe in its
legitimacy under any circumstances. This might be a direct response to the Iraq fiasco,
but the difference may also result from different historical experiences.
This evolution of Poland’s public opinion seems to be strongly related to the
perceived success of Poland’s EU membership. While immediately after the
accession in may 2004 a large part of the public were apprehensive about the
consequences of joining the EU, soon the support for EU integration had started to
raise rapidly up to more than 80%. By the second half of 2007, it had become clear
that the majority of Poles favoured more pro-European rather than pro-American
foreign policy, that is exactly the opposite of the policy pursued by Jaros³aw
Kaczyñski’s government.
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3. The transatlantic dimension of Tusk’s foreign policy
Following the 2007 elections, Poland has had a conservative-liberal governmentled by Donald Tusk cohabiting with a conservative-nationalist president, LechKaczynski. In the Polish constitutional system, the power lies mostly with the
Prime Minister’s office, nonetheless the President has special prerogatives in the field 
of foreign policy. Polish foreign policy has therefore been marked by a rivalry
between these two centres of power, which makes it difficult to define the Polish
foreign policy agenda.
Responding to popular demand, during the election campaign in the autumn of
2007 Donald Tusk, the leader of the victorious Civic Platform party, promised to
complete the gradual withdrawal of Polish troops from Iraq. This election promise 
was fulfilled in the autumn of 2008, which met with the criticism of both the
President Lech Kaczynski as well as the key opposition party Law and Justice
(PiS).
The second issue in Polish-American relations, which was addressed during the
2007 elections, was the placement of the US anti-missile shield in Poland. Tusk
promised to review the negotiations, initiated by the Kaczynski government in
2006, from the viewpoint of specific benefits for Poland’s security. Thus Tusk
made it clear that he did not regard the installation of the shield as an improvement
in Polish security by the virtue of the presence of a piece of American military
hardware on Poland’s soil. On the contrary, he assumed that the shield in itself was 
a liability which needed to be compensated by other measures. The negotiations
were concluded in August 2008. In exchange for hosting the shield, the Bush
administration promised to beef up Poland’s obsolete air defense system as well as 
to give Poland additional security guarantees. Since the signing of the agreement
in the wake of the Russian invasion of Georgia, public opinion in Poland, long
hostile to the project, made a U-turn and the outcome of the negotiations was
supported by a clear majority of Poles. However, later on this support had started
to wane again.
The Russian invasion of Georgia in August 2008 and the subsequent partition of this
country highlighted the importance of the security issues for Poland’s transatlantic
agenda. It also demonstrated different responses between the president and the
government. While both centers of power share the critical view of Russia’s foreign
policy and the need to contain it, the differences concern the means that can be
applied to this purpose and particularly the language of the debate on Russia. The
government has been avoiding ostentatious political gestures favoured by President
Kaczynski and putting more trust in international – especially European –
cooperation, e.g. by endorsing Sarkozy’s mediation efforts and refraining from the
opposition to the opening of EU-Russia Partnership talks.
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At the same time both the president and the government supported the prospective
inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine in the preparations for NATO membership by
offering them Membership Action Plans.
4. Polish responses to Barack Obama’s victory
During the months of the American presidential campaign the Polish publicopinion had been less enthralled by the race and less enthusiastic aboutBarack Obama’s candidacy than the public in Germany and other West
European countries. According to the Transatlantic Trends Survey, relatively few
Poles (28%) thought that Obama’s victory would improve US-EU relations (as
opposed to 51% of the Europeans who so believed).
The coverage of the American presidential elections in the Polish media emphasized
the skillfulness of the Obama’s campaign rather than substantive issues which were
debated by the key candidates. Especially the Polish right wing media tried to convey
the impression that Obama was a ‘lightweight’ candidate who owed his success to
‘Obamamania’ generated by ‘liberal’ and ‘left wing’ Western media. The Polish
media and politicians also watched closely the reactions of both Obama and McCain
to the war in Georgia, usually praising the latter’s response.
However, in the immediate run up to the elections the Polish media coverage of the
campaign greatly intensified and a majority of Poles came to support Obama’s
candidacy over McCain, thus joining the European mainstream.
According to the TT Survey, when asked about the priorities of both the new US
administration and the EU leaders, the Poles enumerated combating international
terrorism, economy and Russia as the key challenges. The key difference between
Poles and other Europeans (especially Germans) was the low priority given by Poles
to the climate change and relatively high priority given to Russia. (The poll was taken
before the events of August 2008.)
5. The relations between the West and Russia
and the post-Soviet region as the focal point
of the new transatlantic agenda
The Polish expectations of the new transatlantic agenda concern regional ratherthan global issues. They are dominated by the Russian resurgence in theregion, as exemplified by both the military intervention in Georgia as well as
the recent assault against Ukrainian energy security.
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Poland will expect the new US administration as well as the EU to be ‘tough on
Russia’ and not to succumb to the illusions of ‘strategic partnership’ with Russia to
tackle global issues (such as Iran). At the same time it would welcome substantive
upgrading of the relations between the transatlantic community and the countries of
the region, particularly those covered by the Polish-Swedish ‘Eastern Partnership’
initiative.
Poland will like to see the US and its European partners taking steps towards
revitalising NATO as a multilateral foreign policy instrument, putting emphasis on its 
traditional functions as regional security provider to its members. Further NATO
expansion should be kept on the agenda. At the same time, Poland will continue to
contribute to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.
Poland would like to see both the EU and the US taking steps to safeguard Georgia’s
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Transatlantic cooperation will be needed to solve 
other ‘frozen conflicts’, which give Russia an excuse to interfere in the affairs of its
neighbours and former Soviet republics: Moldova (Transnistria) and Azerbaijan
(Nagorno-Karabakh) as well as potential conflicts such as Crimea in Ukraine.
Energy security will remain a key challenge for the nascent European foreign policy. 
Although the key to tackling this issue lies within the EU and the creation of genuine
free market in energy within Europe, transatlantic cooperation will be required in the
establishment of altarnative supply routes, which are not controlled by Russia (eg. the 
Nabucco pipeline).
Last but not least, democracy promotion should become a part of the new
transatlantic agenda. Barack Obama administration has a unique chance to restore
American image abroad and part of this process would be to ‘de-toxify’ the concept of 
democracy promotion, largely compromised during the Bush era. The revitalised
Community of Democracies, which was established in the wake of the Warsaw
declaration of June 2000, should become the key tool of transatlantic cooperation,
while both US and UE and its member states should create synergy between old and
new initiatives in the field of democracy promotion, such as the newly established
European Partnership for Democracy.
6. Bilateral Polish-US issues and their impact
on the EU-US transatlantic agenda
The outcome of the anti-missile shield negotiations was broadly seen in Polandas a success (with both the government and the president vying to take creditfor it). It is therefore expected that the new US administration will stand by the
provisions of the agreement. This concerns not only the placement of the single
battery of the Patriot missiles (as is stipulated in the agreement) but the subsequent
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sale of additional missiles and other high-tech military equipment to Poland. Poland
will expect its EU partners, especially those which are also NATO members, to stand
by the declaration of the Bucarest summit stating that the shield is a contribution to
European security.
The continuing requirement for Polish citizens to obtain a visa before traveling to the
US still causes popular resentment towards the US administration. Any progress in
this field would help to improve the public perceptions of Polish-American relations
and should best be achieved within the EU format.
Conclusions: is there a threat of an EU divide regarding
the transatlantic agenda?
Poland’s perception of the transatlantic agenda has largely been shaped by theRussian resurgence in Georgia, Ukraine and throughout the post-Soviet region.The situation in the Middle East (Iran, Iraq and Palestine) is viewed as
significant in so far as progress in this area would allow the US and the EU to devote
more attention to the resurgent Russia. Other issues, such as climate change or the
new global financial architecture, which are a priority for Poland’s EU partners, are
seen as less urgent. This does not mean that Poland will oppose the EU transatlantic
agenda in these and other policy areas. On the contrary, Poland is likely to support
such initiatives as long as they do not contradict Polish foreign policy objectives.
Poland also expects that its concerns will be taken seriously by key European
partners, especially Germany and France, and that Poland and other new member
states will be recognised as legitimate contributors to EU-wide debate on the aims and 
priorities of EU foreign policy and the new transatlantic agenda. Attempts to
marginalize or silence the concerns of NMS could bring back the specter of the old
and by now obsolete divisions from the early Bush era. The responsibility for
establishing a common European agenda vis-B-vis the US lies with all the EU
partners.
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